Heuristic Schelling: Economy of Organized Crime

Serie

  • MPRA Paper

Resumen

  • This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.

fecha de publicación

  • 2011-06

Líneas de investigación

  • Civil War
  • Colombia
  • Government
  • Latin America
  • Protection Agencies
  • Security

Issue

  • 31306