The Weak State Trap

Serie

• NBER Working Papers

Resumen

• Development outcomes come in ‘clusters’ that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to flourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the micro level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing influences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.

autores

• Robinson, James A.
• Fergusson, Leopoldo
• Molina, Carlos A.

fecha de publicación

• 2020

Área temática

• D72 - Procesos políticos: búsqueda de rentas económicas, cabildeo, elecciones, legislaturas y comportamiento de los votantes
• D73 - Burocracia; Procesos administrativos en organizaciones públicas; Corrupción
• H26 - Evasión fiscal y elusión fiscal

Enfoque geográfico

• Colombia  Country
• South America  Continent

Issue

• 26848