Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games

Resumen

  • This chapter examines again contexts of incomplete information but in sequential move games. Unlike simultaneous-move settings, sequential moves allow for players’ actions to convey or conceal the information they privately observe to players acting in subsequent stages and who did not have access to such information (uninformed players). That is, we explore the possibility that players’ actions may signal certain information to other players acting latter on in the game.

fecha de publicación

  • 2016

chapter number

  • Capítulo 9

Edición

  • Springer

Líneas de investigación

  • Game Tree
  • High-productivity Type
  • Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
  • Shaded Branches
  • Signaling Game

Número Estándar Internacional de Libros (ISBN) 10

  • 978-3319329635

Página inicial

  • 257

Última página

  • 302

Volumen

  • 1st Edition