Publicado en
- Revista de Economía Institucional
La reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante
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General
Resumen
- This article shows that for a citizen with reciprocal preferences, voting can be a rational act. Even in elections with many voters, when the probability of being the pivotal voter is close to zero, the utility generated by strong reciprocal sentiments can compensate the material costs of voting. This paper offers a behavioral model with social preferences that represents the conditions that make voting more attractive than abstention. Using the dynamics of replication to explore the voting game evolution, it concludes that positive reciprocal sentiments promote voting for the candidate in power, while negative reciprocity promotes abstention or voting for a rival candidate.
autores
fecha de publicación
- 2007
Enfoque geográfico
- Colombia Country
- South America Continent
Información Adicional
Página inicial
- 149
Última página
- 188
Volumen
- 9
Issue
- 16