A Note on “Evolution of Preferences”

Publicado en

  • Journal of Mathematical Economics


  • A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent’s preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent’s preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.

fecha de publicación

  • 2017

Líneas de investigación

  • Efficiency
  • Evolution of Preferences
  • Indirect Evolutionary Approach

Identificador de objeto digital (DOI)

  • https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005

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