Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Valuation Around the World

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Blogs Publicados

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General

Publicado en

• Journal of Financial Economics

Resumen

• Using a large sample of firms from 38 countries over the 2001–2012 period, this study finds evidence that, following the adoption of say on pay (SoP) laws, chief executive officer (CEO) pay growth rates decline and the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance improves. These changes are concentrated in firms with high excess pay and shareholder dissent, long CEO tenure, and less independent boards. Further, the portion of top management pay captured by CEOs is lower in the post-SoP period, which is associated with higher firm valuations. Overall, these results suggest that SoP laws are associated with significant changes in CEO pay policies.

autores

• Correa, Ricardo
• Lel, Ugur

fecha de publicación

• 2016

Área temática

• G15 - Mercados financieros internacionales
• G34 - Fusiones; Adquisiciones; Reestructuraciones; Gobierno de la empresa
• G38 - Gobierno y financiación de la empresa: Política pública y regulación
• M12 - Gestión de personal; ejecutivos; compensación ejecutivo

Investigaciones

Líneas de investigación

• CEO Pay Slice
• Executive Compensation
• Firm Valuation
• Regulations
• Say on Pay Laws

Perfiles

Identificador de objeto digital (DOI)

• https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.003

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