Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information: Theory and Experiment


  • Working Paper Series


  • We develop a model of interdependent value auctions in which two types of bidders compete: insiders, who are perfectly informed about their value, and outsiders, who are informed only about the private component of their value. Because of the mismatch of bidding strategies between insiders and outsiders, the second-price auc- tion is inefficient. The English auction has an equilibrium in which the information outsiders infer from the history of drop-out prices enables them to bid toward attaining ecffiency. The presence of insiders has positive impacts on the seller¡¯s revenue. A laboratory experiment confirms key theoretical predictions, despite evidence of naive bidding.

fecha de publicación

  • 2018

Líneas de investigación

  • Asymmetric Information Structure
  • English Auction
  • Experiment
  • Interdependent Value Auctions
  • Second- price Auction


  • no114