The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee


  • 2006 Meeting Papers


  • This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically inefficient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank's control is infrequently adjusted.

fecha de publicación

  • 2006-12

Líneas de investigación

  • Committees
  • Dynamic Voting
  • Interest Rate Smoothing
  • Status Quo Bias


  • 206