Despite high levels of mistrust in the police, this study presents empirical findings that challenge expectations of biased norm enforcement by police officers. Through a lab-in-the-field experiment using a dictator game with third-party enforcement, we examined the allocation decisions of 209 future police officers toward both in-group and out-group members. Our findings reveal an equitable distribution of resources, regardless of whether the recipient is a police officer or a civilian, demonstrating an approach to fairness. Police students, however, are more likely to reward when engaged with in-group members, whereas they are more likely to sanction if the recipient is a civilian. Additionally, we study the disparity between actual behaviors and civilian expectations using an incentivized survey. Although the probability of sanctioning was high, civilian respondents overestimated the likelihood that police students engage in costly sanctions. Incentives and reporting a higher trust in the Police are correlated with higher predictive accuracy. The findings enrich the literature on the principal-agent problem in law enforcement, offering insights into institutional legitimacy and addressing the challenges of ensuring equitable enforcement practices in developing countries.
