Crime, Punishment and Social Norms

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Blogs Publicados

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General

Serie

• SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

Resumen

• We analyze the interplay between economic incentives and social norms when individuals decide whether or not to engage in criminal activity. More specifically, we assume that there is a social norm against criminal activity and that deviations from the norm result in feelings of guilt or shame. The intensity of these feelings is here endogenous in the sense that they are stronger when the population fraction obeying the norm is larger. As a consequence, a gradual reduction of the sanctions against criminal activity, or of the taxation of legal incomes, may weaken the social norm against crime. Due to the potential multiplicity of equilibria in our model, such a gradual change may even induce a discontinuous increase in the crime rate. We show that law enforcement policies may have dramatic and permanent effects on the crime rate, and lead to hysteresis. We also define political equilibrium under majority rule and show how a majority of individuals, who feel no guilt or shame from violating the law, in political equilibrium can exploit a minority who do have such feelings.

autores

• Villa, Edgar
• Weibull, Jörgen

fecha de publicación

• 2005-11

Área temática

• D01 - Comportamiento microeconómico: principios fundamentales
• D11 - Economía del consumidor: teoría
• D72 - Procesos políticos: búsqueda de rentas económicas, cabildeo, elecciones, legislaturas y comportamiento de los votantes

Investigaciones

Líneas de investigación

• Crime
• Political Equilibrium
• Punishment
• Social Norm

Información Adicional

Issue

• 610