The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets the Natural Rate of Unemployment

Publicado en

  • European Economic Review


  • This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.

fecha de publicación

  • 2004

Líneas de investigación

  • Asymmetric Preferences
  • Inflation Bias

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