publicaciones seleccionadas
-
artículo
- The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives 2020
- Democracy Does Cause Growth 2019
- The Need for Enemies 2016
- He Who Counts Elects: Economic Elites, Political Elites, and Electoral Fraud 2015
- When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence 2008
- The Weak State Trap
-
documento de trabajo
- Anti-social norms 2024
- Anti-social norms 2024
- The Interaction of Economic and Political Inequality in Latin America 2024
- The Interaction of Economic and Political Inequality in Latin America 2024
- The interaction of economic and political inequality in Latin America 2024
- Constitutions and Order: A Theory and Evidence from Colombia and the United States 2023
- Constitutions and Order: A theory and comparative evidence from Colombia and the United States 2023
- The Weak State Trap 2020
- The Weak State Trap 2020
- The Long Shadow of the Past: Political Economy of Regional Inequality in Colombia 2017-03
- The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives 2016-09
- Democracy Does Cause Growth 2014-03
- Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality 2013-12
- The Need for Enemies 2012-08
- He Who Counts Elects: Determinants of Fraud in the 1922 Colombian Presidential Election 2009-07
- When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence 2008-05
- Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia 2007-06